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COMMENTS
PARTIAL RESOLUTION OF MINERAL LEASES
The provisions of the Louisiana Civil Code making a putting
in default a prerequisite to a suit for resolution of a contract,
due to a passive breach 2 by one of the parties created a situation
in which mineral lessees in Louisiana were not encouraged to be
prompt in the payment of royalty to their lessors.3 As long as a
lessee had not been put in default, he stood in no danger of losing
his lease. He could retain the use of his lessor's money subject
only to the possibility that his lessor might sue to collect legal
interest. The Louisiana courts reacted to this situation by classifying a failure by a lessee to pay royalty for an appreciable time
without justification an active rather than a passive breach of a
lease obligation, 4 thereby obviating a putting in default as a
prerequisite to a suit for resolution. However, the results of this
action by the courts have not all been desirable. A lessor is now
encouraged to sit back and hope that his lessee will not discharge
the royalty obligation so that the lease can be resolved and
another granted on terms much more favorable to the lessor. The
lessee's total investment in the leased premises is subject to
forfeiture when he is slow to pay royalty even when there has
been no request by the lessor that he pay. Two recent casesSellers v. Continental Oil Co.5 and Fontenot v. Sunray Mid-

Continent Oil Co.--presented factual situations which made this
harshness particularly apparent. These factual situations also
lent themselves to the intermediate remedy of partial rather
than total resolution of the leases involved. The court which
decided both of these cases availed itself of this intermediate
remedy.
1. LA. CiV. CODE arts. 1912, 1931, 1932. Article 1912 requires a putting in
default as a prerequisite to a "rescission" of a contract. "Rescission" was
apparently a mistranslation of the French. The term "rdsolution" was used
in the French version of the article in the Civil Code of 1825. See 3 LOUISIANA
LEGAL ARCHIVES, COMBINED EDITION OF THE CIVIL CODES OF LOUISIANA 1055 (1942).
2. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1931 both distinguishes and defines passive and
active breaches of contracts. Article 1932 provides that no putting in default is necessary as a prerequisite to a suit for resolution due to an active

breach of a contract.
3. See Comment, 24 LA. L. REV. 618 (1964).
4. Pierce v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 140 So.2d 19 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962); Bailey
v. Meadows, 130 So.2d 501 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961). Where there is an adequate reason for delay, the lessee is given an opportunity to perform. See
Broadhead v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 166 So.2d 329 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1964); Fawvor v. United States Oil of Louisiana, Inc., 162 So.2d 602 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1964).
5. 168 So.2d 435 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).
6. 197 So.2d 715 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967).
[84]

19691

COMMENTS

In Sellers, plaintiff and his co-owners in indivision had executed a lease which affected one large tract.7 As a result of partial releases by lessee, the acreage under lease had been reduced
to two small non-contiguous tracts. The lessee had paid all of
the co-lessors the royalty to which they were entitled from production from a unit underlying one of the two tracts, but lessee
had paid only those co-lessors who had executed royalty division
orders the amounts due them from production from a unit underlying the second tract.8 Plaintiffs had not been paid. The court
divided the lease vertically, maintaining it as it affected the
first tract but resolving it as it affected plaintiff's interest in the
second tract. In Fontenot, plaintiff's father and mother had executed two mineral leases which together affected approximately
four hundred acres. 0 By donation and inheritance, plaintiff and
his brothers and sisters had become co-owners in indivision of
the acreage. The acreage was underlain by a large unitized
stratum which itself was underlain by two smaller unitized
strata. Lessee had paid all of the co-owners the royalty due them
from production from the original large stratum. However, as in
Sellers, lessee had paid only those co-owners who had executed
royalty division orders the amounts due them from production
from the two smaller strata. Plaintiff had not been paid. The
court divided the leases horizontally, keeping them in force as
to the original large unitized stratum, but resolving the leases
as they affected plaintiff's interest in the two smaller unitized
strata as well as all of the strata which were not in any unit.
These cases raise three important issues: first, whether a
mineral lease may be resolved as to only a part of the physical
premises it covers; second, assuming that such a partial resolution is permissible, whether it may be accomplished by horizontal division as in Fontenot or should only be accomplished by
vertical division as in Sellers; third, whether a mineral lease
7. See Sellers v. Continental Oil Co., 168 So.2d 435 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1964) (Transcript No. 1253).
8. Since all of each tract was included in a unit, whether the lease
should have been divided by units or by tracts was not before the court,
and accordingly the case should not be considered authority for the proposition that leases will be divided by tracts and not units in any factual situation in which the choice of the method of division would affect the result
as would be the case if a lease covered two tracts and one was partially
underlain by a unit on which royalty had been paid while the other was
partially underlain by a unit on which royalty had not been paid. See text
accompanying note 33, infra, for this writer's suggestion that the retained
acreage clause included in most lease forms in use in Louisiana could be
utilized by the courts to effectuate lease division in such a circumstance.
9. See Fontenot v. Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co., 197 So.2d 715 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1967) (Transcript No. 1906).
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may be resolved as to the interest of one or more of the co-lessors
when it is not resolved as to the interests of all (a) in a situation in which the co-lessors are owners in indivision of the leased
premises or (b) in a situation in which the co-lessors are not
owners in indivision of the leased premises.
The Legislation and the Issue of Resolution as to Only a
Part of the Physical Premises
The code provisions relative to resolution of contracts are
found in articles 204610 and 2047.11 These articles to be properly
construed must be read in the light of the traditional preference
of the civil law for execution rather than resolution of contracts.
In France, which has legislation on resolution of contracts very
similar to our own, a party in default may perform until the
moment a judgment against him resolving a contract becomes
final. If he may appeal a lower court judgment, he may perform
until the time to take an appeal has expired or until the judgment is sustained on appeal. 12 The Louisiana Code articles do
not require that we go this far. The provisions of articles 2046
and 2047 are limited in the case of leases by article 2729 which
provides that "the neglect of the lessor or lessee to fulfill his
engagements, may also give cause for a dissolution of the lease,
in the manner expressed concerning contracts in general, except
that the judge cannot order any delay of the dissolution." Nevertheless, the policy of our law to allow a lessee a reasonable
opportunity to perform is still guaranteed in the Civil Code by
the provisions making a putting in default a prerequisite to resolution of any contract under ordinary circumstances.' 3
Articles 2046 and 2047 make no mention of partial resolution of contracts. This is understandable. If the policy of the
10. LA, Civ. CODE art. 2046: "A resolutory condition is implied in all com-

mutative contracts, to take effect, in case either of the parties do not comply with his engagements; in this case the contract is not dissolved of
right; the party complaining of a breach of the contract may either sue

for its dissolution with damages, or, if the circumstances of the case permit,
demand a specific performance." For a general and thorough review of the
jurisprudence and a discussion of the implied resolutory condition in commutative contracts, see Monroe, The Implied Resolutory Condition for NonPerformance of a Contract,12 TUL. L. Rev. 376 (1938).

11. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2047: "In all cases the dissolution of a contract may
be demanded by suit or by exception; and when the resolutory condition
is an event, not depending on the will of either party, the contract is dissolved of right; but, in other cases, It must be sued for, and the party In
default may, according to circumstances, have a further time allowed for
the performance of the condition."
12. FRENCH Civ. CODE art. 1146; 2 PLANIOL, CmiL LAW TREATISE no. 1318
(La. St. L. Inst. transl. 1959).
13. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1912, 1931, 1932.
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civil law favoring execution rather than resolution of contracts
were observed, there would be very little need for partial resolution. If a party had been requested to perform his obligation
fully and could do so easily, but refused to do so, a court could
justifiably grant total resolution. 1 4 On the other hand, if a party
had substantially performed his obligations under a contract but
either could not complete the performance or by performing
would suffer costs out of proportion to the injury caused by
defective performance, a court, according to the circumstances,
could refuse resolution and grant the other party damages to
make him whole. 15 No situations would arise, like those in
Sellers and Fontenot, in which the lessees had substantially performed and were ready and anxious to complete their performance but were not permitted to do so.
Though the Civil Code did not contemplate the need for
partial resolution, its policy of allowing freedom in the field of
contract1 6 would certainly support a private contractual agreement for this result. As will be noted below most Louisiana
lease forms contain clauses which could be used to justify partial resolution.
The Jurisprudence and the Issue of Resolution as to
Only a Part of the Physical Premises
There was no reported case prior to Sellers and Fontenot in
which partial resolution was allowed due to failure by the lessee
fully to discharge his royalty obligations. But no factual situation in which royalty had been paid on production from one
part of the premises covered by a lease but not on production
from another had been presented to the courts. There were,
14. See generally Monroe, The Implied Resolutory Condition for NonPerformance of a Contract, 12 TUL. L. REV. 376 (1938).
15. The Civil Code specifically provides for such adjustment in numerous
instances. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2492-2494, 2496, 2497, 2701 (corresponding to
FRENCH CxV. CODE arts. 1617-1621, 1765); 2520 (corresponding to FRENCH CIV.
CODE art. 1641). French jurisprudence has recognized other instances in

which such adjustment must take place. This adjustment has been referred
to as partial resolution of contracts, but in all the instances in which such

adjustment has been allowed there was (1) substantial performance on the
part of the party in default and (2) either an impossibility of complete performance or a situation in which complete performance would subject the
party in default to costs out of proportion to the injury caused by defective

performance. See 6 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITb PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS n °
430 (Esmein ed. 1930). Where complete performance by the party in default
is easily possible, the French courts "do not consider they have the power
to modify the contract to restrict the effects of the resolution; they must
uphold the contract in its entirety or resolve it as a whole." 2 PLANIOL,
CIVIL LAW TREATISE no. 1321 (La. St. L. Inst. transl. 1959); Bescangon, 12 Jan.

1865, D.65.2.20; Algiers, 19 Jan. 1886, D.87.2.169.
16. LA. Cxv. CODE art. 1764.
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however, prior cases which had allowed partial resolution of
mineral leases by vertical division for failure of the lessee adequately to develop part of the premises. 17 In these cases the
leases were resolved as they affected the part of the premises on
which proper development had not taken place. However, the
plaintiff lessors in these cases either had prayed for only partial
resolution 8 or, in one case, had not appealed from a lower court
judgment awarding partial resolution. 19 The court in this latter
case specifically acknowledged that the judgment of the lower
court in awarding partial resolution was erroneous and that had
plaintiff properly presented his appeal the lease would have
been resolved except as to a small tract which a "retained acreage" clause in the lease would have permitted the lessee to
keep. 20 Sellers and Fontenot were the first cases in which partial resolution was allowed for any reason when a perfected
21
appeal for entire resolution had been made.
In the absence of any special stipulation in the lease on
which partial resolution can be based, the issue whether a lease
may properly be partially resolved when there has been payment of royalty on production from one unit but no payment
on production from another necessarily involves the issue
whether the payment of royalty from one unit should be considered the entire rent for the maintenance of the lease for that
unit or should simply be considered part of the rent for the
maintenance of the lease as a whole. If the latter is the case,
when there is payment of royalty from only one of two producing units, there is a partial payment of the rent for the maintenance of the lease as a whole, but there is also a partial failure
of payment of the rent as to the whole. Hence, if the lease were
resolved, there would be no conceptual basis for distinguishing
the unit on which royalty had been paid from the rest of the
leased premises. Even as to it there would have been partial
failure of cause for the maintenance of the lease.
The jurisprudence prior to Sellers and Fontenot adopted this
17. Humble Oi1 & Ref. Co. v. Romero, 194 F.2d 383 (5th Cir. 1952); Eota
Realty Co. v. Carter Oil Co., 225 La. 790, 74 So.2d 30 (1954); Carter v.
Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co., 213 La. 1028, 36 So.2d 26 (1948); Nunley v. Shell
Oil Co., 76 So.2d 111 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1954).
18. Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Romero, 194 F.2d 383 (5th Cir. 1952); Eota
Realty Co. v. Carter Oil Co., 225 La. 790, 74 So.2d 30 (1954); Nunley v. Shell
Oil Co., 76 So.2d 111 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1954).
19. Carter v. Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co., 213 La. 1028, 36 So.2d 26 (1948).
20. Id.
21. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1966-1967
Term-Mineral Rights, 28 LA. L. Rav. 355, 363 (1968).
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latter view. In the decisions on the subject, the courts have fre22
quently invoked the concept that a mineral lease is indivisible.
There has been marked confusion of civil and common law concepts of indivisibility. 23 What is important for the purposes of
this discussion is not, however, the accuracy of the courts' use
of the concepts but what in fact the courts have meant when
they have declared that mineral leases are indivisible. Specifically, the courts have held that when a mineral lease is executed
covering several tracts of land, even if the tracts are not contiguous, only one lease is created so that operations or production
(with its concomitant royalty payment) on one of the tracts will
maintain the lease as a whole. 24 The courts have also held that
operations or production from a unit, even when it includes land
adjacent to the leased acreage and even when the unit well has
25
been on the outside acreage, will maintain the lease as a whole.
22. Delatte v. Woods, 232 La. 341, 94 So.2d 281 (1957); LeBlanc v.
Danciger Oil & Ref. Co., 218 La. 463, 49 So.2d 855 (1950); Hunter v. Shell
Oil Co., 211 La. 893, 31 So.2d 10 (1947); Nabors v. Producers' Oil Co., 140
La. 985, 74 So. 527 (1917); Cochran v. Gulf Ref. Co., 139 La. 1010, 72 So. 718
(1916); Murray v. Barnhart, 117 La. 1023, 42 So. 489 (1906).
23. For a discussion of the characteristics of an indivisible obligation
at

civil law, see 1 AUBRY

ET RAU, COURS DE DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS § 301 (La. St.

L. Inst. transl. 1965); LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2108, 2109. For a discussion of the
characteristics of an indivisible contract at common law, see 6 S. WILLISTON,
A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS H§860-72 (3d ed. 1962).
24. Reagan v. Murphy, 235 La. 529, 105 So.2d 210 (1958).
25. Delatte v. Woods, 232 La. 341, 94 So.2d 281 (1957); LeBlanc v.
Danciger Oil & Ref. Co., 218 La. 463, 49 So.2d 855 (1950); Hunter v. Shell
Oil Co., 211 La. 893, 31 So.2d 10 (1947).
Parties often, however, derogate from the general rule that operations
on or production from a unit will maintain the lease as a whole. Frequently
they insert a "Pugh clause" which provides that unit production and
royalty payment will maintain the lease only as to the acreage Included in
the unit and that the lease must be maintained as to any acreage outside
the unit in some other way such as by the payment of delay rentals. The
clause does not, however, provide conversely that a lease may be maintained
as to acreage outside a unit by some means such as the payment of delay
rentals, if royalty is not paid on the production from the unit. Thus, even
In a lease which contains a "Pugh clause" it would seem that payment of
royalty on the unit production should be considered part of the cause for
the maintenance of the lease as a whole. The courts may, however, decide
that unitization divides a lease containing a "Pugh clause" so that in
effect two leases are created-one lease for the unit, another lease for the
outside acreage. If the courts do reach this conclusion, then of course a
lessee who fails to pay royalty on unit production will not be subject
to the forfeiture of the lease on the outside acreage even if the production
from this unit is the only production from the premises covered by the
original lease.
The Supreme Court has shown a considerable resistance to holding that
unitization divides a lease containing a "Pugh clause." In Odom v. Union
Prod. Co., 243 La. 48, 141 So.2d 649 (1962), the court, on original hearing,
decided that unitization did divide the lease, but on rehearing the court
specifically refrained from deciding the issue and reversed on other grounds
its previous holding. Several considerations may have moved the court to
retreat from its original position. First, there is no indication that when
parties insert a "Pugh clause" they intend to derogate from the rules
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The court in Sellers and Fontenot did not, however, permit
these considerations to control. Rather Fontenot said that Sellers
had established the principle that courts may for reasons of
equity treat a lease as divisible and thus exempt from resolution
the leased interests as to which the lessee has complied with his
lease obligations. 26 The court further buttressed its opinion by
noting that the plaintiff lessor had himself accepted royalty payment from only one of the two units when he knew both were
producing and that he could not therefore be heard to complain
when the court treated the unit on which he had been paid as
separate from the rest of the lease.2 T The court could also have
pointed out that leases almost invariably contain a provision that
permits the lessee to terminate the lease as it affects any selected
part of the covered premises but to maintain the lease as it
affects the rest of the premises.2 8 A release clause does not, of
course, relieve a lessee from full performance of his obligations
as to the part of the leased premises he retains, but the clause
does indicate that the lessor has no expectation that the lease
will not be terminated in part.
Methods of Lease Division-Vertical and Horizontal
Certain factual situations-like the one in Fontenot, in
which one productive stratum underlies another, each stratum
relating to mineral leases any more than the parties specifically say that
they do. Rather the clause is probably inserted because the lessor desires
to receive remuneration for the part of any lease outside a unit in addition
to the royalties provided by production from the unit. Second, the decision
that a mineral lease is divided by unitization will lead to extraordinary

complexity in mineral lease titles. Units are frequently altered and reformed
by the Commissioner. If

a lease Is susceptible of being divided each time

the Commissioner creates or alters a unit, one lease could conceivably be
transformed into many leases thereby altering greatly the relationship between lessor and lessee. A discussion of the ways in which this relationship
would be altered is, however, beyond the scope of this Comment. See
Gremillion, The Pugh Cause and Some of Its Ramifications, 11 LA. B.J.
123 (1963).

26. Fontenot v. Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co., 197 So.2d 715, 721 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1967).
27. Id. at 722.

28. In the two Fontenot leases, the release clauses, which were Identical,
did not specifically contemplate horizontal division of the lease: "Lessee
may, at any time prior to or after the discovery and production of minerals
on the land, execute and deliver to Lessor or place of record a release or
releases of any portion or portions of the lands and be relieved of all
requirements hereof as to the land surrendered." (See Fontenot v. Sunray
Mid-Continent Oil Co., 197 So.2d 715 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967) (Transcript No.
1906). The release clause in more recent forms In use in South Louisiana
specifically contemplates horizontal division of the lease. For instance, the
clause in Bath's New South Louisiana Revised (5)-Pooing form permits
"release or releases of any portion or portions of the lands or any stratum
or strata."
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having been included in a different unit, and royalty having
been paid on only one unit 29-do not lend themselves to vertical
division of the lease. There is no reasonable alternative to
horizontal division if partial resolution is to take place. In such
circumstances, this writer sees no reason to deny horizontal
division.
Horizontal division may be accomplished in at least two
ways: resolving the lease except as to the part on which the
lessee has fully discharged his obligation; or resolving the lease
only as it affects the part of the lease to which the lessee's fault
may be attributed. The court in Fontenot specifically adopted
the former method of division.30 It resolved the two leases
involved as they affected not only the stratum of the unit on
which royalty had not been paid but also the strata not included
in either unit. When it is remembered that total resolution is
the ordinary remedy under our law and that partial resolution
is a variation adopted by the courts to reduce the harshness of
total resolution, the method of division chosen by the court
seems correct.
The decision in Fontenot to divide the leases horizontally
due to failure by the lessee fully to discharge his royalty obligation may herald decisions in which leases are divided horizontally due to failure by a lessee fully to discharge other
obligations, such as his implied obligation to develop the leased
premises. A situation could easily arise in which a lessee was
producing from a given stratum and in which there was a possibility of additional production from a deeper stratum. The
lessor might well desire that this deeper stratum be developed.
If the lessor requested such development, if his request were
29. Similarly, a situation in which one productive stratum overlapped
another and each stratum was drained by a different well, but in which
royalties had been paid on production from only one well, would not lend
itself to vertical division.
30. Fontenot v. Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co., 197 So.2d 715 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1967). It could be argued that the adoption of this method of lease
division indicates that in the future when there are two units on the leased
premises, each unit affecting only a given stratum, and royalty having been
paid on production from only one unit, the lease will be maintained as It
affects only the stratum of this unit regardless of whether the units overlap. A person making this argument would simply claim that the lessee
had discharged his obligation only as to this stratum and hence that the
lease could be maintained only as to It. There Is a reasonable basis, however,
for predicting that the courts will not allow such an argument to prevail.
In Fontenot, the court did not indicate any intention to grant horizontal
resolution except in cases in which the factual situation precluded partial
resolution by vertical division. Moreover, the Supreme Court has indicated
that it will not allow horizontal division except in special circumstances
such as Fontenot presented. See text accompanying note 32 infra.

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30

reasonable, and if his lessee refused to undertake the development, the situation would lend itself to horizontal division of
the lease.31 By availing itself of the remedy of horizontal division, a court could protect the lessee's investment by allowing
him to keep the lease as to the stratum from which he was producing while simultaneously protecting the lessor's interest in
further development by freeing the other strata of the leased
premises.
The extent to which courts in Louisiana will allow horizontal division of mineral leases is, however, unclear. In denying
writs in Fontenot, the Supreme Court wrote: "While we have
grave doubt that that portion of the opinion dividing the leases
horizontally is correct, we nevertheless find that, under the facts
and circumstances as found by the Court of Appeal, the result
reached by that court is correct. '32 It is hoped that the court
will soon grant writs in a case involving the need for horizontal
division so that the state of uncertainty in the Louisiana jurisprudence will be relieved.
The Relevance of Various Lease Clauses to the
Issue of Partial Resolution
In some instances the courts could find a basis for the use
of the remedy of partial resolution in the provisions of the lease
forms which are under consideration. Where partial resolution
can be based on the provision of the lease itself, this writer feels
that the court should base its partial resolution on these provisions in order that the contractual freedom of the parties may
be respected. A "retained acreage clause" is found in most lease
forms presently in use in Louisiana. The lease form used in
Sellers and those used in Fontenot contained such a clause.33 In
31. The Oklahoma Supreme Court recently decreed cancellation of a
mineral lease by horizontal division under similar circumstances. Barnes v.
Mack Oil Co., 376 P.2d 279 (Okla. 1962).
32. Fontenot v. Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co., 250 La. 898, 199 So.2d 915
(1967).
33. The retained acreage clauses in the Fontenot and Selers leases read
as follows: "In the event of the forfeiture of this lease for any cause, Lessee

shall have the right to retain around each well then producing oil, gas, or
other minerals or being drilled or worked on the number of acres fixed
and located by the spacing or unit order of any Regulatory Body of the
State of Louisiana or of the United States under which said well is being
drilled or produced, or if said well has been or is being drilled on a unit

pooled by Lessee as provided herein, then Lessee may retain all of the acreage comprising said pooled unit; and if no spacing order has been issued nor
any pooled unit established, then Lessee shall have the right to retain forty
(40) [Sellers read twenty] acres surrounding each well then producing or
being drilled or worked on, such forty acres to be in as near a square form
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neither case, however, did the court discuss the impact of the
clause on resolution. The court may well have chosen not to do
so because twice previously the Louisiana courts specifically
refused to apply the clause to cases in which there was a fail84
ure of royalty payment on the one unit on the leased premises.
It is not difficult to understand why the courts have been reluctant to apply the clause. If all of the leased premises were
included in one or more units or if only the parts of the premises of little mineral potential were not included, the clause, if
it were literally applied, would either preclude the remedy of
resolution altogether or drastically reduce the remedy's economic significance. It is at least doubtful that a lessor intends so
to limit the effectiveness of his remedy of resolution when he
signs a lease form containing a retained acreage clause. The
clause is, however, only destructive of the reasonable effectiveness of the remedy of resolution (and hence should be considered against public policy) when it is sought to be used to
preserve a lease as to a unit with which some fault of the lessee
is associated. For instance, if, as in previous cases, 35 there were
only one unit on the premises and royalty had not been paid on
this unit, it would be highly inequitable for the lease to be
maintained as to that unit. However, if two or more units were
involved and royalty had been paid on all but one of them, it
would not be inequitable to apply the clause to maintain the
lease as to the units on which royalty had been paid, but to
refuse, on the grounds of public policy, to apply it in order to
preserve the lease as to the unit on which royalty had not been
paid. This writer feels that a clear enunciation by the courts of
an intention to so apply the clause would be desirable. One of
the advantages of so applying the clause is that it gives a formula - sanctioned by the contract of the parties - by which
leases may be divided in a multiplicity of circumstances. The
formula could be used regardless of whether the lease to be
resolved covered one or more tracts. If there were two or more
units on the leased premises, the lease could be kept in force as
to the acreage contained within each unit on which royalty had
as is practicable." Fontenot v. Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co., 197 So.2d 715
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1967) (Transcript No. 1906); Sellers v. Continental Oil Co.,
168 So.2d 435 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964) (Transcript No. 1253).

34. Melancon v. Texas Co., 230 La. 593, 89 So.2d 135 (1956); Pierce v.
Atlantic Ref. Co., 140 So.2d 19 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962).
35. Id. See also Broadhead v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 166 So.2d
329 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964); Fawvor v. United States Oil of Louisiana, Inc.,
162 So.2d 602 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964); Bailey v. Meadows, 130 So.2d 501 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1961).
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been paid. If no units had been created, but spacing orders had
been issued, and there were two or more wells on the leased
premises, the lease could be maintained as to the acreage allotted
to each well on which royalty had been paid. If no units had
been created and no spacing orders issued, the lease could be
maintained as to the number of acres around each well (on
which royalty had been paid) provided for by the clause.
The method of division contemplated by the usual retained
acreage clause (retention as to acreage rather than retention as
to a stratum) is not, of course, susceptible of application to
situations which lend themselves only to horizontal division.
Lease draftsmen should consider altering the clause to cover such
situations. Where horizontal division cannot be based on any
clause in the lease, this writer feels that the courts should simply apply the method of division utilized in Fontenot: resolving
the lease except as to the portion of the leased premises as to
which the lessee has discharged his obligations. If there is separate unitization of overlapping strata, the lease should be maintained as to the stratum of the unit on which royalty has been
paid. If there is no unitization, but there is drainage of overlapping strata by separate wells, the lease should be maintained
as to so much of the stratum that was efficiently being drained
by the wells on which royalty has been paid. The number of
acres specified to be retained around each well in the retained
acreage clause might give a useful indication of the extent to
which the parties contemplated that one well could drain a
stratum.
A recent lease form in use in South Louisiana includes a
clause making a thirty-day written notice a prerequisite to any
suit for a resolution of the lease. 86 If this clause is enforced by
the courts, very seldom will a suit ever arise for resolution of
a lease written on this form when the fault of the lessee has
been non-payment of royalty. Upon receiving notice, the lessee
will presumably act promptly to satisfy his obligation, 7 but the
36. Bath's New South Louisiana Revised (8)-Poozing: "In the event
Lessor considers that Lessee has failed to comply with one or more of its
obligations hereunder, either expressed or implied, Lessor shall notify
Lessee in writing setting out specifically in what respects Lessor claims
Lessee has breached this lease. The service of such notice and lapse of thirty
(30) days without Lessee's meeting or commencing to meet the alleged
breaches shall be a condition precedent to such action by Lessor on this
lease."
37. In all the following cases, lessee tendered royalty as soon as lessor
threatened to bring suit for resolution: Melancon v. Texas Co., 230 La. 593,
89 So.2d 135 (1956); Fontenot v. Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co., 197 So.2d 715
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same problem discussed at the opening of this paper-bureaucratic indifference of lessees in promptly paying royalty in the
event no notice is given-will recur. The Louisiana courts in
order to avoid this problem virtually ignored the provisions of
the Civil Code.38 It is doubtful that the courts will or should
respect more highly the stipulations of private parties. The
courts may well declare that the notice clause is intended to be
applied only to bona fide disputes about the obligations of the
lessee - not to instances where, without justification, he has
failed to pay royalty which was indisputably due his lessor. In
Melancon v. Texas Co.,39 the Supreme Court used this theory in
effect to nullify the "judicial ascertainment clause" 40 which in
the past was frequently found in lease forms. The court of
appeal, in Bollinger v. Republic Petroleum Corp., 41 however,
distinguished the new notice clause from the former judicial
ascertainment clause on the ground that as a prerequisite to a
suit for resolution under the ascertainment clause it was necessary that a lessor not only notify his lessee of an alleged failure
to perform an obligation but also that the lessor obtain a judgment specifying in what respect the lessee was at fault. It is
hoped that the Bollinger case will be overruled.
Resolution of a Mineral Lease As to Some
But Not All of the Co-Lessors
In Sellers and Fontenot the respective leases were resolved
as to the interests of some but not all of the respective co(La. App. 3d Cir. 1967); Sellers v. Continental Oil Co., 168 So.2d 435 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1964); Fawvor v. United States Oil of Louisiana, Inc., 162 So.2d 602
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1964); Pierce v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 140 So.2d 19 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1962); Bailey v. Meadows, 130 So.2d 501 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961).
38. See text accompanying note 4 supra.
39. 230 La. 593, 89 So.2d 135 (1956).
40. The clause in the Melancon lease reads as follows: "After production
of oil, gas, sulphur or other mineral has been secured from the land covered
hereby, this lease shall not be subject to forfeiture or loss, either in whole
or in part, except after judicial ascertainment that the Lessee has failed to
perform and discharge its obligations hereunder and has been given a reasonable opportunity thereafter to prevent such loss or forfeiture by complying with and discharging its obligations as to which Lessee has been
judicially determined to be in default." Melancon v. Texas Co., 230 La. 593, 607
n.7, 89 So.2d 135, 139 n.7 (1956),
41. 194 So.2d 139 (La. App, 1st Cir. 1966). This case is critized in Note,
28 LA. L. REv. 504 (1968), wherein the writer suggests that the notice clause
should be considered merely declaratory of the existing Louisiana law
which requires a putting in default as a prerequisite to a suit for resolution
due to a passive breach but not due to an active breach. The writer apparently feels that if this rule was to have been contractually changed the
parties should specifically have made the clause applicable to an active
breach.
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lessors. 42 In both cases, the respective co-lessors were owners
in indivision. 43 This writer feels that when there is ownership
in indivision among lessors this practice should not be continued.
On the basis of sound civilian doctrine, the courts have held that
one co-owner in indivision or a group of co-owners in indivision
cannot execute a predial or a mineral lease which will be effective against any other co-owner in indivision. 4 4 It would seem
therefore that when a lease is resolved as to the interest of one
co-owner in indivision, he, being no longer bound by his obligations under the lease, could demand that the lessee cease his
operations. 45 This writer doubts that, practically speaking, the
courts would allow this result. Allowing a former lessor who
owns only a fractional interest in the leased premises to halt the
lessee's operations would be harsh on the lessee and would interfere with the expectations of the lessors as to whom the lease
was not resolved because, when production ceased, their royalties would cease as well. Very probably the courts will give a
former lessor who owns an undivided interest only the right to
claim all of his share of production less production costs.
Thereby, however, the courts will in effect alter the lease contract rather than resolving it because the obligation of the lessor
to permit the lessee to explore for and produce oil and gas will
remain. An anomaly will arise in our law in that an owner as
to whom a lease has been resolved will be treated differently
from an owner who never leased at all.
When there is no ownership in indivision among co-lessors,
there is less reason to forbid resolution of a lease as to the interest of one lessor but not as to the interest of another since each
lessor would separately have the right to explore for oil and
gas or to grant a lease to a third party effective against the
42. Sellers v. Continental Oil Co., 168 So.2d 435 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964);
Fontenot v. Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co., 197 So.2d 715 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1967).

43. See Fontenot v. Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co., 197 So.2d 715 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1967) (Transcript No. 1906); Sellers v. Continental Oil Co., 168
So.2d 435 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964) (Transcript No. 1253).
44. Sun Oil Co. v. State Mineral Board, 231 La. 689, 92 So.2d 583 (1956);
Amerada Petroleum Corp. v. Murphy, 204 La. 721, 16 So.2d 244 (1943); Gulf
Ref. Co. v. Carroll, 145 La. 299, 82 So. 277 (1919). But see Stinson v. Marsten,

185 La. 365, 169 So. 436 (1936); United Gas Public Serv. Corp. v. Kansas-La.
Pipeline Co., 176 La. 1024, 147 So. 66 (1932). If a lease were resolved as It
affected only part of the physical premises covered by the lease, the lessor
could only, of course, demand that the lessee cease his operations as they
affected this part.
45. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2045: "The dissolving condition is that which, when
accomplished, operates the revocation of the obligation, placing matters in

the same state as though the obligation had not existed."
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owners of other interests in the property. 46 Thus, if a lease were
resolved as to the interest of one such lessor, this lessor could
not demand that the lessee cease his operations. However, the
jurisprudence prior to Sellers and Fontenot indicated that even
where there is no ownership in indivision among lessors, a lease
may not be resolved as to the interest of one but not all of the
lessors. In Melancon v. Texas Co.,47 the Supreme Court resolved
a lease in its entirety for failure of royalty payment despite the
fact that the plaintiff surface owner had, after leasing, sold
7/16ths interest in the minerals to persons who did not wish to
join as plaintiffs. The owners of the mineral interests were
made parties defendant and judgment was rendered by default
against them. However, as the court in Sellers48 noted, Melancon can be distinguished on the ground that in that case the
lessee had not paid royalties to any of those to whom royalty
was due. In Sellers, the lessee had paid the uncomplaining lessors. Melancon can also be distinguished on the ground that the
court found coercive conduct on the part of the defendant.
Caution should always be used by the courts in resolving
a lease as among lessors since such division may often adversely
affect the interest of the lessors as to whom the lease is not
resolved. It goes without saying that the interest of the lessors
is not ordinarily enhanced by a reduction in the economic incentive causing their lessee to develop the premises or produce marginal wells. There is less economic incentive for a lessee to do
these things when he does not have a full interest lease. The
extent to which his incentive is reduced is likely to be proportionate to the fractional part of the whole lease interest which
he loses.
Lessors' Possible Liability to Lessee for Well Costs
When a lease is resolved, whether in whole or in part, the
lessee may have a valid claim against his former lessor for all
or part of the well costs. This liability could be based on the
46. See Sun Oil Co. v. State Mineral Board, 231 La. 689, 92 So.2d 583
(1956); Starr Davis Oil Co. v. Webber, 218 La. 231, 48 So.2d 906 (1950). The
latter case holds that there is not co-ownership in indivision between the
owner of a mineral servitude for a fraction of the minerals under a tract
and a landowner who also owns a fraction of the minerals. There is not, of
course, ownership in indivision between owners of separate mineral servitudes on a tract. There would, however, apparently be ownership in indivision between two owners of the same mineral servitude. See G. HARDY,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON LOUISIANA MINERAL LAW 3-57 (1964); Denegre, CoOwnership of Oil and Gas Interests in Louisiana,24 TUL. L. REv. 288 (1950).
47. 230 La. 593, 89 So.2d 135 (1956).
48. Sellers v. Continental Oil Co., 168 So.2d 435 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).

98

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30

general principle of unjust enrichment contained in the Civil
Code or more specifically in article 50849 or article 2726.50 This
latter article, however, offers the most logical basis for the liability since it regulates the rights of a lessor and lessee at the termination of a lease. The article embodies the principle that
when the lessee has added an improvement to the leased premises which is difficult or impossible to remove the lessor at the
end of the lease may take advantage of the improvement but
must pay the lessee a fair price. Unfortunately the article gives
no suggestion of how to determine what constitutes a fair price.
This writer feels that in making the determination of fair price
the courts should allow the lessee to claim the lesser of either
the cost of the improvement or the enhanced value of the lessor's minerals.5 ' If the courts do so, a lessor will be protected
against the anomaly which would result if he were forced to
49. LA. CIv. CODE art. 508: "When plantations, constructions and works
have been made by a third person, and with such person's own materials,
the owner of the soil has a right to keep them or to compel this person
to take away or demolish the same.
"If the owner requires the demolition of such works, they shall be
demolished at the expense of the person who erected them, without any
compensation; such person may even be sentenced to pay damages, if the
case require it, for the prejudice which the owner of the soil may have
sustained.
"If the owner keeps the works, he owes to the owner of the materials
nothing but the reimbursement of their value and of the price of workmanship, without any regard to the greater or less value which the soil may
have acquired thereby.
"Nevertheless, if the plantations, edifices or works have been made by
a third person evicted, but not sentenced to make restitution of the fruits,
because such person possessed bona fide, the owner shall not have a right to
demand the demolition of the works, plantations or edifices, but he shall
have his choice either to reimburse the value of the materials and the price
of workmanship, or to reimburse a sum equal to the enhanced value of the
soil."
In the absence of special legislation, It would have been clear that a
mineral lessee is not protected by this article. The article protects only possessors. See Riggs v. Lawton, 231 La. 1019, 93 So.2d 543 (1957); Hammonds
v. Buzbee, 170 La. 573, 128 So. 520 (1930); Alexius v. Oertling, 13 Orl. App.
216 (1916). A mineral lessee as the owner of a personal right would not
have been a possessor under Louisiana law. Only the owner of a real right
possesses for himself. LA. R.S. 9:1105 (1950) purports, however, to give the
mineral lessee the status of the owner of a real right. LA. CODE Cxv. P. arts.
3660 and 3664 specifically indicate, moreover, that a mineral lessee possesses
for himself. The status of a mineral lessee as the owner of a real right or as
being capable of possessing for himself is, however, quite uncertain. See
Hall, The JudicialNature of the Louisiana Mineral Lease, ELEVENTH ANNUAL
INSTITUTE ON MINERAL LAW 106 (1964); Comment, The Louisiana Mineral
Lease as a Contract Creating Real Rights, 35 TUL. L. REV. 218 (1960).
50. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2726: "The lessee has a right to remove the improvements and additions which he has made to the thing let, provided he
leaves it in the state in which he received it.
"But if these additions be made with lime and cement, the lessor may
retain them, on paying a fair price."
51. This means of determining "fair price" is sanctioned by analogy to
LA. CIv. CODE art. 508(4), quoted note 49 supra.
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pay well costs on a poor producer where these costs exceeded
any expectations he might have of profit from production. Not
only will it be necessary for the courts to determine what constitutes a fair price for a well, it will also be necessary for
them to determine what proportion of the fair price the lessor
who is successful in his action for resolution should pay.
It would seem that if a lease is resolved at a date later
than that of the start of production, the lessee, since he benefits
from the production before the date of resolution and so benefits from the well, should pay a part of its cost.52 The claim which
he could make against his lessor would accordingly be depreciated. Similarly, it would seem that if a lease is resolved only
as it affects one of two units served by a well, which has been
dually completed, the lessee should be permitted to charge his
lessor only with the well costs apportionable to the unit affected
by the resolution. The courts in making the calculations necessary to determine the amount well costs should be depreciated
and the way in which they should be apportioned could turn
for guidance to the rulings of the Commissioner of Conservation
settling disputes which have raised the necessity for similar calculations under the provisions of the Conservation Act5" regard54
ing the liability of non-unit operators for well costs.
The jurisprudence lends support to the proposition that a
lessee will be entitled to claim a fair price for his well. The
courts have indicated a willingness to prevent the unjust enrichment which would occur if one party were allowed to claim
production deriving from the operations of another without also
incurring liability to share in the drilling costs. The courts have
held that a true owner of a tract who claims the production of
a well drilled in good faith by a lessee under an invalid lease
must pay well costs to the lessee.5 5 Similarly, the courts have
52. In Fontenot v. Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co., 197 So.2d 715 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1967), the court painstakingly reviewed the previous jurisprudence as
to the proper date for the effectiveness of the resolution of a lease for failure
by the lessee to pay royalty. On the basis of this analysis, the court decided
to resolve the lease in question as of the date of formal demand for resolution, a date over two years after the beginning of production.
53. LA. R.S. 30:1-20 (1950).
54. LA. R.S. 30:10A(1)(c) (1950). For a discussion of the problems raised
by the unit cost-sharing provisions of the act see Jorden, Unit Well Costs,
FOURTEENTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON MINERAL LAW 15 (1967). See also Commissioner's Order No. 125 A-i-a.
55. Huckabay v. Texas Co., 227 La. 191, 78 So.2d 829 (1955); Allied Oil
Co. v. Ayers, 152 La. 19, 92 So. 720 (1922); Cooke v. Gulf Ref. Co., 135 La.
609, 65 So. 758 (1914); Martel v. Jennings-Haywood Oil Syndicate, 114 La.
351, 38 So. 253 (1905); Scott v. Hunt Oil Co., 152 So.2d 599 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1963); Arkansas Fuel Oil Corp. v. Weber, 149 So.2d 101 (La. App. 2d Cir.
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held that an owner of a fractional interest in the minerals under
a tract who does not participate in the drilling expenses must
pay his share of costs before he can claim his share of production. 6
If the courts do allow compensation to the lessee for well
costs, they will have to decide whether he can claim the amount
due him in cash or must wait to be paid out of production. The
courts encountered a similar problem in deciding whether the
provision of the Conservation Act 7 regarding the sharing of unit
well costs by non-unit operators required payment in cash or
permitted payment out of production. The problem has not yet
been resolved but the most recent case 58 indicates that when the
non-unit operator is instrumental in causing the unit to be created, he must pay in cash. It could be argued that where a lessor
seeks the resolution of a lease so that the economic benefit accruing to him from the well's production will be increased, he
too should have to pay in cash the costs of the well. This result
might, however, be harsh on a lessor who was impecunious.
Moreover, the fact that it is the lessee's fault that the contract is
resolved suggests that the lessee could hardly justifiably complain if he were required to collect his costs out of production.
M. Hampton Carver

TORT LIABILITY OF LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS
UNDER SECTION 1983 OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
Since the United States Supreme Court decided Monroe v.
Pape' in 1961, a growing area of tort law under Section 19832 of
the Civil Rights Act has developed governing the conduct of
police officers. One court has said: "The Civil Rights Act created
a new type of tort: the invasion, under color of law, of a citi1963); see Comment, 15 TUL. L. REv. 291 (1941). The Supreme Court has
recently shown a liberal attitude in allowing suits based on unjust enrichment. See Minyard v. Curtis Prod., 251 La. 624, 205 So.2d 422 (1967); Comment, Action de in rem Verso in Louisiana, 43 TUL. L. REV. 263 (1969).
56. Bee note 55 supra.
57. LA. R.S. 30:10(A)(1)(c) (1956).
58. Superior Oil Co. v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 165 So.2d 905 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1964). See also Hunter Co. v. McHugh, 202 La. 97, 11 So.2d 495
(1942); Jorden, Unit Well Costs, FOURTEENTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON MINERAL
LAw 15 (1967).
1. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1958).

